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RICHARD A. BOOTH*
The Fall and Rise of Federal Corporation Law
FOREWORD
IT IS QUITE REMARKABLE THAT CORPORATION LAW remains the province of the
states. The proper role of federal law in corporate governance has been debated
since at least the 1930s. Although one could begin the story earlier, the first major
incursion of federal law into the area came with Congress' passage of the Securities
Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2
Securities regulation is one thing. But corporation law is quite another. In 1940,
the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Business Law undertook to develop
the Model Business Corporation Act3 (MBCA) because the ABA wanted to be in a
position to offer an appropriate statute to Congress when a call for federal corpora-
tion law arose. The call never came, but the MBCA was nonetheless born and was
eventually followed by approximately thirty-five states.
In the mid-1960s, federal securities law began to offer protection for stockhold-
ers that had not been available under state law-at least not under Delaware law,
which governs most publicly traded companies.' In 1964, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a private right of action under federal proxy rules.6 In 1968, the Second
Circuit held that Rule 10b-5 governed press releases by publicly held companies
and insider trading by their employees! And in the same year, Congress passed the
Williams Act, establishing federal rules for the conduct of tender offers.8 No doubt
these developments encouraged Professor William Cary of the Columbia University
School of Law to write his landmark 1974 Yale Law Journal article, stating that
* Marbury Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, The Fall and Rise of
Federal Corporation Law Conference Chair.
1. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2006)).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006)).
3. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 1.24 (2002).
4. See, e.g., GEORGE C. SEWARD & WILLIAM W. NAUSS, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE § 2.01, at 32 n. 10 (2d
ed. 1977).
5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competi-
tion over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 611-12 (2002).
6. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
7. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
8. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2006)); see Recent
Developments, SEC Proxy Regulation: Private Enforcement and Federal Remedies, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1336,
1336-39 (1964).
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Delaware was leading a race to the bottom in standards of corporate conduct, and
calling for federal standards of corporate responsibility.9
The race to the bottom theory would later be questioned and arguably disproved
by legal scholars.'0 But in the mid-1970s, it appeared that federal securities law
might well supplant a large part of state corporation law. For a plaintiff, federal
court was the place to be. Then, in 1977 the Supreme Court decided Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green." Although Santa Fe was not the first Supreme Court deci-
sion to confine the reach of Rule 10b-5, 2 it was the first to emphasize and preserve
the traditional role of state corporation law.'3 In essence, Santa Fe held that federal
securities law applied only if there was a failure of disclosure. 4 The Court explained
that Rule 10b-5 did not require the parent corporation in a cash-out merger to
disclose to minority stockholders that there was no business purpose for the merger
because there was no state law requirement that there be a business purpose for the
merger. 1"
At first that might seem like a victory for state law. But the decision also in-
creased the threat level for a federal takeover. After all, Congress might be inclined
to enact new legislation to govern the internal affairs of corporations if existing
federal securities law had reached the limits of its applicability, as Santa Fe seemed
to indicate.
It was six months later (to the day) when the Supreme Court of Delaware
handed down its decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co.,'6 holding that indeed there
was a business purpose requirement for mergers." The irony is that with Singer on
the books, Santa Fe would have been decided the other way. But the die was cast for
the course of federal law. Following Santa Fe, the federal courts looked to state law
to determine the contours of fiduciary duty not only for mergers, but also for
insider trading, takeover defenses, and virtually every other issue that came before
them under federal securities law.
9. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705
(1974) (describing the phenomena as a "race for the bottom, with Delaware in the lead"). It is no coincidence
that Cary also served as SEC Chairman from 1961 to 1964, or that the most expansive ruling by the Supreme
Court in connection with Rule lOb-5 was authored in 1970 by William 0. Douglas, who served as SEC Chair-
man from 1937 to 1939.
10. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977) (explaining that competition has been
critical in allowing corporations to compete freely).
11. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
13. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 464.
14. Id. at 470.
15. Id. at 478-79.
16. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983).
17. Id. at 975-76.
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Singer was a mixed blessing for Delaware. Although it may have avoided a federal
takeover of state corporation law, Singer also meant that in Delaware a plaintiff
could challenge a merger by incanting the mantra of no business purpose. Every
merger was thus reviewable by the courts. Moreover, if a merger was found want-
ing, the remedy was quite generous. Rescissory damages gave the plaintiffs the
value of what they would have had if the merger never occurred, encouraging even
more litigation."8 Singer did not last long. It was overruled in 1983 by Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 9 which did away with the business purpose requirement.2" But Wein-
berger also installed more effective protections for stockholders, requiring arms
length negotiations in parent-subsidiary mergers?' Since that time, Delaware has
been quite vigilant about stockholder rights.
There was not much talk about the federalization of corporation law during the
1980s and 1990s. During that period, Congress passed two acts addressing insider
trading,22 and two acts addressing private securities litigation,23 the second of which
sought to eliminate state court jurisdiction over failure to disclose actions. But
these statutes were more about problems with federal law than they were about
jurisdictional competition. There was little if any objection when Congress admin-
istered the coup de grace with the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996 (NSMIA), 24 preempting most state corporation law. 2' Few legal scholars seem
to view the essential demise of state securities laws-blue sky laws-with much
regret. That may be because they recall their first years in big firm practice doing
blue sky work.
Then came the demise of Enron, WorldCom, and the other corporations. Al-
though these scandals that began in late 2001 were mostly about accounting prac-
18. See, e.g., Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971) (awarding rescissory damages, al-
though the court apparently misconceived the proper definition of out-of-pocket damages); Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (upholding rescissory damages), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Gottlieb v.
Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (awarding rescissory damages), affd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); Sarlie v. E.L. Bruce Co., 265 F.
Supp. 371, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (awarding rescissory damages).
19. 457 A.2d 701.
20. Id. at 704.
21. Id. at 715 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109- 10 (Del. 1952)).
22. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ITSAJ; Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ITSFEA]. For a discus-
sion of ITSFEA, see Barbara Bader Aldave, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An
Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALB. L. REV. 893 (1988); Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REV. 465 (1990); Stuart j. Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145 (1989); Richard M. Phillips, New
Insider Trading Legislation, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at 17.
23. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 743 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4) [hereinafter PSLRAJ; Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SLUSA].
24. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1996)).
25. See Zuri-invest AG v. Natwest Fin. Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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tices, they also implicated corporate governance and executive compensation. So it
is not surprising that the legislation that followed-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
200226 (SOX)-includes several provisions that intrude into areas that have tradi-
tionally been left to state law. And that is not to mention a raft of new SEC regula-
tions based in some cases on a questionably broad reading of statutory authority.
27
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the Department of Justice has chosen to
prosecute pretty much whenever it can, thus turning many offenses that once
might have been seen as mere breaches of fiduciary duty into federal crimes.
The question is whether this is the beginning of a new movement to federalize
corporation law28 or merely a border skirmish. On the one hand, SOX establishes
rules about director independence, committee composition, executive compensa-
tion, and conflict of interest transactions that have never been part of federal law.29
To the extent that SOX addresses these matters, they would seem now to be off
limits for the states to say or do otherwise. On the other hand, the changes wrought
by SOX are relatively specific. The papers produced by this conference address this
question from a variety of angles.
Finally, for those who are fans of British television comedies, the title of this
conference was inspired by my all time favorite-The Fall and Rise of Reginald
Perrin. Aside from the obvious parallel-that federalization seemed to have been
staved off only to raise its ugly head again in 2002-Reggie was all about corporate
governance. Reginald Iolanthe Perrin (RIP) faked his own death to escape his life as
a middle manager of Sunshine Desserts (PLC) only to return as an entrepreneur
purveyor of useless goods and then to found a cult of disaffected businesspeople.
Think of Atlas Shrugged with a laugh track. It could happen here. Who needs the
grief that goes with being a public company when there is all that private equity
about?
26. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
27. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2006).
28. Incidentally, there is a certain ambiguity inherent in the idea of federalization. While the first meaning
that comes to mind is that the federal government has assumed control, federalism also refers to the division of
authority between state and federal government.
29. See generally Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J.
CORP. L. 625 (2004).
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